[specific to democracy]
Cohen defends a view of deliberative democracy that maintains substantive features that constrain what the procedure can be used to democratically justify. He argues that these substantive features follow from the fact of reasonable pluralism.

Mouffe argues that liberal democracy is characterized by an internal conflict--a paradox--created by the combination of classical liberalism and the tradition of democratic theory. Mouffe criticizes theorists of democracy for attempting to permanently remove this internal tension by aiming to develop a consensus view on the principles that should define our community. Mouffe instead proposes a solution to the tension that aims at balancing the values of liberalism and democracy through the agonistic practice of valuing and sustaining dissent. Dissent in the democratic process is, for Mouffe, a more important goal for democracy than consensus. Under an agonistic relationship, opponents will treat each other as friendly, respectful adversaries arguing and working for their own position to be victorious, instead of treating each other as enemies to be destroyed.

Peter argues that even a deliberative democracy faces the political egalitarian’s dilemma. This article is a response to Cohen and other advocates of deliberative democracy.

Saffon and Urbinati argue that democracy is constituted by its procedures and that these procedures, and the conditions required for the procedures to fucntion, are what defends equal liberty within a democracy.




[specific to compulsory voting]
These articles empirically defend the conclusion that compulsory voting, when enforced, improves the distribution of income to the benefit of the poor.

Under a system of voluntary voting, political shyness negatively affects the welfare of vulnerable members of our community. On the other hand, the importance of compulsion is linked to notions of reciprocal obligation and the centrality of inclusive citizenship.

This article argues that, counter-intuitively, compulsory voting increases the chances that the less popular candidate is elected.

Lacroix argues from a liberal point of view, which is not the kind of liberalism that is meant. Instead, liberalism in the political theory sense refers to a philosophy that regards the political significance of liberty and equality to be foundational to deciding how our government should govern, what are justified constraints on how governments may legitimately treat individuals (and even how individuals may justly treat each other as political agents). Lacroix argues that from the point of view of a liberal, compulsory voting can be defended on several grounds. In other words, she argues that compulsory voting is justified by the principles of liberty and equality.

This article argues that there is no right to not vote and that the defense of one rests on a misunderstanding of what kind of freedom a right to vote consists of.